Information Society Watch

In my first post I had suggested that it is critical that the link between Internet Governance (IG) and the Development Agenda (DA) needs to be translated in to concrete normative principles and policy proposals which flow from these principles. However the current debates on the Internet Governance Caucus lists and the recent IGF consultation in Geneva remind us that the substantive content of such a ‘development agenda’ is still torn between a concern for providing access and with the governance of critical internet resources. I will sidestep this debate for the moment and try to elaborate on the key axes along which the future debate on the development agenda is likely to take at IGF Rio 2007.

All discussions about internet governance are concerned about two key aspects: institutional design issues and the substantive principles which shape and develop the internet. The development agenda should cover both these aspects in order to have a meaningful impact on the future of the internet.

In the WIPO development agenda the institutional dimensions of Intellectual Property (IP) policy were not very controversial as IP law has conventionally been the preserve of nation-states and more recently some international institutions like WIPO and the WTO have come to play a significant role. Hence, democratizing the work of these international institutions and urging them to reframe their decision making processes and substantive agenda was a significant aspect of the DA campaign on IP law.

The significantly different institutional framework in IG which includes government agencies at national and international levels, for profit and not for profit corporations and technical societies composed in diverse manner poses serious challenges to the framing of a DA on the appropriate institutional framework in IG. The early stage in the evolution of these IG institutions and their novel character when compared with traditional international institutions results in complex discussions on accountability and legitimacy. Models of accountability range from political representation at one end and technical expertise at the other and versions of corporate responsibility to its shareholders in between.

As multi-stakeholderism has emerged as a founding principle of the IGF process and provides a format for mediating between these competing principles of accountability and legitimacy, the historical experience of the International Labour Organization may provide us with a useful model of an international institution with considerable legitimacy which creates norms successfully by applying the multi-stakeholder principle. Securing agreement on the legitimate and accountable IG institutions and their process of decision making is critical to the institutionalization of the DA and its successful implementation.

Some participants in the IG debate propose that we need to pay attention only to this first aspect of internet governance and once we develop an appropriate set of institutions then we will automatically secure good results. Such an approach is doomed to failure because by avoiding an explicit discussion on the ends of governance, discussions about the institutional design debate gets mired in proxy debates about appropriate ends. In my next post I will develop some of the substantive principles which are essential to a DA for IG.